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Market imperfections may cause ¯rms and workers to under-invest in speci¯c training.
This paper shows that pro¯t sharing may be a suitable instrument to enhance speci¯c
training investments, either by enhancing wage °exibility or by increasing the returns to
training. As a result, pro¯t sharing not only increases productivity by means of an e®ort
e®ect, but also by increased training investments. Furthermore, the results suggest that
older workers' employability can be improved if a pro¯t-related remuneration is paid.
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A high-quality employment relationship is of great importance for both workers and ¯rms.
Therefore, both have an incentive to invest in the productivity of the match. Investing in
training is an important instrument for increasing workers' productivity and hence the quality
of the match. Training can be de¯ned as either general or speci¯c, according to Becker (1964),
where general training is productive in other matches as well (and hence the costs and returns
are borne by the worker) while speci¯c training is only productive with the current employer
(and hence is paid for by the ¯rm). In a perfectly competitive world without any frictions, the
distinction between general and speci¯c training is economically meaningful, and investment
in both types of training is e±cient. However, capital market imperfections, labor market
imperfections and information problems may cause under-investment in training (see Leuven
(2005) for an overview). This paper discusses two sources of market imperfections that may
cause low investment levels in speci¯c training.1 One source is the presence of asymmetric
information within the employment relationship. For example, when e®ort levels are di±cult
to monitor for the employer, worker shirking may result, where workers choose to exert less
e®ort than is optimal from the employers' point of view and hence productivity is lower. This
lower productivity, however, may signal a low rate of return to training for employers deciding
on whether or not to invest in speci¯c training. Since the potential rate of return is higher than
the signalled rate, speci¯c training investments may be lower than in the absence of imperfect
information. Second, low levels of speci¯c training may arise due to wage rigidities. When
wages fail to adjust to the business cycle, worker separations are necessary as an adjustment
mechanism, where ¯rms may need to lay o® more workers in an economic downturn, whereas
workers may prefer to quit more often during an economic expansion. This mobility reduces
expected tenure and hence the expected payo® period for speci¯c training investments. As a
result, low levels of speci¯c training investments may arise. To the extent that trained skills
1The more recent training literature illustrates that in a situation of imperfect markets the distinction
between general and speci¯c training may not be that clear-cut (Stevens (1996, 1999)) and ¯rms may actually
¯nd it pro¯table to invest in general training when they have oligopsonistic wage-setting power (e.g. Acemoglu
and Pischke (1998, 1999a)). This paper focuses on training which has a ¯rm-speci¯c character as this is most
likely to improve the quality of the current worker-¯rm match.
2are (partly) transferable to other employers and imperfect competition in the labor market
creates external bene¯ts of training for other ¯rms, the low training levels in the worker-¯rm
match may aggravate under-investment in training at the economy-wide level (e.g. Acemoglu
and Pischke (1998, 1999a), Stevens (1996, 1999)).
This paper investigates whether a pro¯t-related pay scheme can be used to increase speci¯c
training investments. First, pro¯t sharing may increase the returns to training. Paying a pro¯t-
related remuneration provides an e®ort incentive to the worker. When worker productivity
increases, employers may ¯nd it more pro¯table to invest in training as the returns to training
may be higher. Second, pro¯t sharing may a®ect worker mobility by enhancing wage °exibility.
When part of the remuneration is linked to the performance of the ¯rm, labor costs adjust
to economic circumstances and hence the number of separations may reduce. For example,
in recessions the ¯rms' labor costs are automatically reduced, thereby reducing the need to
layo® workers. Similarly, wages rise automatically when the economic situation improves,
thereby reducing the workers' quit propensity.2 As a result, expected tenure may increase which
extends the expected payo® period of training investments and thereby may eventually provide
an incentive to invest (more) in speci¯c training.3 Consequently, pro¯t sharing may augment
speci¯c training investments by increasing both the returns to training and the total payo®
period. Because of this, paying a pro¯t-related remuneration may boost labor productivity
both via an e®ort e®ect and via a training e®ect.
Using data for the UK over the period 1998-2003, this study investigates the relationship
between pro¯t sharing and speci¯c training and the e®ects on worker productivity, measured
by workers' wages. Though there is a huge literature on the e®ects of pro¯t sharing and
training on wages, these issues are discussed more or less separately in previous literature.4
2Note that this argument is only partially valid as it implicitly assumes that the individual ¯rm faces the
same shocks as the market as a whole. In a situation where the individual ¯rm faces a positive economic shock
while the economy is in recession, the positive e®ects on quits may be even larger. In the situation where
the ¯rm faces a negative economic shock while the economy is booming, the net e®ect on mobility may be
ambiguous due to less layo®s and more quits.
3Previously, ¯ring and exit costs have been suggested as a means to reduce worker separations and to
increase training e±ciency (Adnett et al. (2004)). However, this came at a cost of less e±ciency in separations.
Introducing pro¯t sharing is not likely to generate such a trade-o® between training and separation e±ciency.
4An important exception is Azfar and Danninger (2001), who argue that pro¯t sharing positively a®ects
wage °exibility, thereby reducing separations and increasing training investments.
3First, this study investigates the e®ect of a pro¯t-related payment on the speci¯c training
incidence. Then, in a second step, a wage equation is estimated to investigate the e®ects of
speci¯c training and pro¯t sharing on worker productivity. The results indicate that pro¯t
sharing has a positive e®ect on training levels, thereby increasing workers' wages by means
of greater worker e®ort and by increased training investments.5 Furthermore, in a third step,
the e®ect of pro¯t sharing and training on workers' employability is investigated by looking at
subsequent worker mobility. In addition, this paper pays attention to the e®ects for workers of
di®erent age groups, where a distinction is made between young, prime-age and older workers.
The training incidence for older workers is far below that of middle-aged workers in almost all
European countries (Arulampalam et al. (2004), OECD (2006)). This may be due to a high
labor market exit probability of older workers compared to younger workers. When workers are
expected to retire in the near future, the payo® period of training investments is relatively short
and hence the incentives to invest in training are rather low. However, a lack of training events
together with the depreciation of skills due to technological progress may create a gap between
wages and productivity for older workers (Dostie (2006)). This causes older workers often to
be characterized as 'expensive labor' which has a negative e®ect on their employability. As a
result, a job separation for older workers is more likely to result in a labor market exit rather
than in the take up of a new job. For young workers the situation is quite di®erent. Even if
they were to experience lower training investments due to being very mobile, their current skills
are more up-to-date. As a result, young workers are more able to ¯nd new employment if job
loss occurs. The situation of older workers may be improved if they are being paid on a pro¯t-
related basis. First, this may elicit a higher e®ort level, thereby increasing worker productivity.
As a result, the wage-productivity gap may be reduced. Second, pro¯t sharing may increase
wage °exibility, thereby reducing the layo® risk. Higher productivity and a lower expected
separation probability may increase the incentives to invest in training.6 This paper therefore
5Azfar and Danninger (2001) only found indirect evidence for a relationship between pro¯t sharing and wage
growth through skill accumulation, possibly because their analyses did not control for unobserved heterogeneity
and di®erent types of training (e.g. training with current employer versus training with previous employers).
6Obviously, pro¯t sharing may also have these positive e®ects on training for young workers, especially if it
can improve their job security in times of cyclical change. However, an increase in training is especially desirable
among older workers given the low job-¯nding rates for this group and the associated negative consequences on
older workers' labor market participation.
4investigates whether pro¯t sharing can be e®ective in improving older workers' employability
and thereby labor market participation of older workers.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 a brief overview of the previous
literature is given. Section 3 describes the data and presents some stylized facts. In section 4
the results of the empirical analysis are presented. Finally, section 5 provides a conclusion.
2 Previous literature
The quality of the employment relationship is of joint interest to both the worker and the ¯rm,
because the surplus of the match is shared between the worker and the ¯rm (Gielen and van
Ours (2006b)). Additionally, the costs associated with a separation provide an incentive for
both the worker and the ¯rm to invest in the productivity of the current match. Speci¯c training
is found to be a good instrument for increasing workers' productivity. Because productivity
information is mostly not available in existing datasets, a natural way to gauge the e®ectiveness
of training is through earned wages, as increased productivity should be compensated with
higher earnings. Several studies have found positive e®ects of speci¯c training on wages (e.g.
Lynch (1992), Parent (1999), Frazis and Spletzer (2005)). The wage e®ect of one additional
speci¯c training event varies between 1 and 4 percent for training with the current employer
and between 2 and 5 percent for previous employer training (Loewenstein and Spletzer (1998)
using US data; Booth and Bryan (2005) using UK data). The duration of the training is taken
into account by Loewenstein and Spletzer (1999) who ¯nd that wages increase by about 3.5
percent for the mean positive training of 2.2 weeks. Frazis and Loewenstein (2005) ¯nd that
wages increase by about 5 percent for the median positive training of 60 hours.7 Employers
are only willing to pay for speci¯c training if they can also reap (part of) the bene¯ts of the
training during a given period. As a result, training is more likely to be provided to workers
7The result of Frazis and Loewenstein (2005) imply an annualized return in the range of 150-180 percent.
Note that the returns to training are relatively high compared to the returns to schooling, which are about 10
percent (Card (1999)). Frazis and Loewenstein (2005) investigate that these relatively high returns to training
can be explained by promotions, direct costs of training, and heterogeneity in wage growth. In addition,
heterogeneity in the returns to training can explain the high returns to training. Hence, the estimated rates of
return should be regarded as the return of training to the trained, and therefore are likely to be greater than
the returns that could have been realized by workers who did not receive training.
5who are less likely to change jobs (Loewenstein and Spletzer (1997)). For workers with a high
separation probability, ¯rms may need an alternative instrument to boost productivity. One
such instrument is pro¯t sharing. Data for di®erent countries have shown that if workers are
being paid a pro¯t-related pay productivity increases by 2-6 percent (Ewing (1996); Cahuc
and Dormont (1997); Booth and Frank (1999); see Prendergast (1999) for an overview). Even
though pro¯t sharing can be applied to stimulate e®ort on the part of all workers, individual
workers' productivity is less targeted than with individual training and free-riding is a potential
risk. Hence, the choice for training versus pro¯t sharing as a means of increasing productivity
may depend on (unobserved) worker characteristics.
Most studies consider pro¯t sharing and training as two distinct issues. However, there
might be a direct relation between the two. Pro¯t-related pay provides an e®ort incentive.
If productivity increases, the returns to training { and hence training investments { increase.
Furthermore, when part of the remuneration is linked to the performance of the ¯rm, labor costs
automatically adjust to economic circumstances and the number of separations may thereby be
reduced. As a result, pro¯t sharing increases expected tenure which may provide an incentive to
increase speci¯c training investments.8 One important exception to the literature is Azfar and
Danninger (2001) who investigate the direct e®ect of pro¯t sharing on the training incidence
and the number of weeks of training. Using NLSY data, they ¯nd strong evidence for pro¯t
sharing reducing layo®s and weak evidence for it reducing worker quits. Furthermore, pro¯t
sharing does not a®ect the training incidence, but is found to have a positive signi¯cant e®ect
on the number of weeks of company training.9 Parent (2004) also concludes that pro¯t sharing
increases the acquisition of skills. This paper pays more attention to the relationship between
pro¯t sharing and training.
Investments in speci¯c training can improve the employability of the worker. Especially for
older workers, speci¯c training is important as they are often characterized as 'expensive' labor
due to a gap between wages and productivity. Dostie (2006) shows that for Canadian men
8Initially, introducing pro¯t sharing may increase worker separations, due to the self-selection of workers
across di®erent ¯rms (Gielen et al. (2006)).
9However, as their analyses do not control for worker and match-speci¯c ¯xed e®ects, the results may be
driven by worker selection if workers who are likely to invest in training sort into jobs which pay a pro¯t-related
wage.
6aged 55 and above productivity is lower than their wage. This causes older workers to be more
subject to being laid o®. Furthermore, as older workers come near to leaving the labor market
because they are near to retirement, training investments may not pay o®. Sanders and De
Grip (2004) use Dutch data to show that ¯rm-internal employability is improved within two
years after participation in training. However, no e®ect is found on external employability (i.e.
between-employer job changes). Evidence of a direct relationship between pro¯t sharing and
training may suggest that pro¯t sharing may have a role in improving employability of workers
as well. This study investigates this relationship in more detail.
3 Data and stylized facts
3.1 Data
The analysis in this paper is based on information from the British Household Panel Survey
(BHPS) for the period 1998-2003.10 The BHPS collects data annually from a representative
sample of approximately 16000 individuals from 9000 households. The dataset contains exten-
sive information on both the individual and the household level, such as individual and spousal
actual working hours, labor market position and transitions, individual and household income,
and other job-related characteristics. The analyses are restricted to male workers between the
ages 16 and 64 in paid employment. Women are excluded from the sample as they are more
likely to have career interruptions which reduce the gains from training.
The dataset provides information on the incidence of pro¯t sharing, since workers are asked
whether or not they have received a pro¯t sharing payment in the previous 12 months. Fur-
thermore, detailed information on training is present in the data. Respondents are asked how
many training schemes they started in the previous year. For the longest three training events
(or all if the total number of training events did not exceed three) detailed information on
the purpose of the training was collected (for more information see Appendix 5.A). Speci¯c
training is de¯ned as having received training which served to increase or improve the skills in
the current job. However, according to the recent training literature, a large share of all speci¯c
10Unless otherwise indicated, the ¯gures and tables in this paper are based on the BHPS data.
7training is reported to be partly general as it also serves to develop general skills.11 This study
focuses on training with a speci¯c character (which may be partly general as well) as the main
aim is to investigate the direct e®ects on productivity and employability.
In the analysis, a distinction is made between young, prime-age and older workers to see
how training investments di®er across the separate age groups and how these a®ect workers'
employability. Young workers are de¯ned as being 29 years old or younger; prime-age workers
are de¯ned as being between 30 and 49 years old; all males aged between 50 and 64 are de¯ned
as older workers.
3.2 Stylized facts
Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics for the di®erent age groups. As can be seen from the
table, older workers invest much less in (speci¯c) training than young and prime-age workers.
However, once it is optimal for older workers to invest in speci¯c training, the number of
training events is not less than for the average worker in the workforce. With respect to the
type of pay, it appears that young and older workers are less likely to receive a pro¯t-related
payment than prime-age workers. Hourly wages are also lower for these two groups. Finally,
the table indicates that the di®erent age groups are quite distinct in their mobility patterns. In
general, young workers are highly mobile, and mobility decreases with age. This is especially
due to mobility to other employment (such as a job change or a transition to self-employment).
Separations to inactivity make up a relatively large share of older workers' mobility. Though
this is to a large extent due to retirement transitions, together with the relatively low proportion
of job-to-job transitions, it suggests that the employability of older workers is relatively poor
compared to that of young and prime-age workers.
Table 2 provides information on the cross-relation between pro¯t sharing and speci¯c train-
ing. It appears that both pro¯t sharing and training are associated with a higher wage. Pro¯t
sharing is not only associated with higher average wages, but also with a larger variance in
the wage. This may suggest that pro¯t sharing may enhance wage °exibility. Also training is
11About 67 percent of all training events is neither completely general nor completely speci¯c. Of all speci¯c
training events, 88 percent also served general purposes.
8associated with a higher variance in the wage (though to a lesser extent than pro¯t sharing).
This may be due to di®erences in rent extraction by ¯rms after investing in training. Further-
more, the table illustrates that workers on pro¯t sharing are more likely to receive training
(28 percent) than workers who do not receive a pro¯t-related payment (22 percent). This may
be due to a positive e®ect of pro¯t sharing on expected tenure or on the immediate returns
to training. However, this evidence is only tentative as other worker characteristics are not
controlled for here. Note also that a large proportion of the labor force receives neither pro¯t
sharing nor training.
Figure 1 illustrates how the incidence of pro¯t sharing and speci¯c training relate to worker
mobility. Workers with pro¯t sharing separate less often from their current employer than
workers without. This holds true for both separations to other employment and for separations
to inactivity. Training is also associated with lower rates of both types of separations, especially
for young and older workers. So, the ¯gure suggests that pro¯t sharing and training may
improve the quality, and hence stability, of the worker-¯rm match.12
4 Empirical analysis
This section investigates the relation between pro¯t sharing, speci¯c training and worker mo-
bility. Section 4.1 determines the direct e®ect of pro¯t sharing on the training incidence. In
section 4.2 the e®ects on worker productivity are estimated. In the analysis, a distinction is
made between two e®ects of pro¯t sharing on wages: the e®ort and the training e®ect. Fi-
nally, section 4.3 investigates how pro¯t sharing and training a®ect employability, by looking
at worker separations. In each section, ¯xed e®ects are included to account for unobserved
worker characteristics.13
12Of course, this result may also be due to reversed causality where low mobile workers sort into jobs that
provide pro¯t sharing or training, as the ¯gure does not control for unobserved characteristics.
13All analyses in this study include all sectors. Excluding the public sector has no e®ect on the results.
Furthermore, when the analyses are restricted to speci¯c training which is (at least partly) paid for by the
employer, the results remain more or less unchanged.
94.1 Training estimation
To investigate whether pro¯t sharing has a positive e®ect on speci¯c training investments, a
logit model is estimated for whether or not some worker i with employer j has started a speci¯c
training course in the year preceding time t (which is reported at survey date t). The ¯xed
e®ects speci¯cation allows for individual worker speci¯c e®ects (®T):





where P indicates the probability that someone acquired training (T), ¤ is an indicator for the
logistic cumulative distribution function, X is a vector of observable characteristics, and PS
is a dummy for pro¯t sharing. The parameters are estimated using Chamberlain's conditional
likelihood method. The results can be found in Table 3, where the second column presents
the results of the ¯xed e®ects speci¯cation.14 From panel A it appears that education level is
a main determinant of training. Higher educated workers have a 15 percentage points higher
training probability than low-educated or non-educated workers.15 Since the payo® of speci¯c
training investments increases with expected tenure and the number of hours worked, temporary
workers are less likely to receive training, while full-time working males are more likely to invest
in training.16
Furthermore, the results indicate that pro¯t sharing positively a®ects the training incidence.
Note however that a large share of the results can be explained by unobserved heterogeneity.
After correcting for the fact that workers who are likely to invest in training may sort into ¯rms
that pay a pro¯t-related remuneration (i.e. selectivity e®ects), the results suggest that pro¯t
sharing increases the probability of training by about 1 percentage point. When age-speci¯c
e®ects are introduced (panel B), it appears that especially young and older workers bene¯t
14Marginal e®ects are presented in square brackets and evaluated at the mean of each of the covariates. In
order to be able to calculate marginal e®ects for the ¯xed e®ects logit, the ¯xed e®ects were assumed to equal
zero.
15Note that the e®ect of education in the ¯xed e®ects speci¯cation can be identi¯ed due to changes in education
level among mainly younger workers.
16Potential endogeneity of the temporary work dummy and the number of working hours is not taken into
account. It seems more likely that people choose to work a certain number of hours in a permanent or temporary
job and then investigate whether training would be possible. Therefore, the temporary job dummy and the
number of working hours are not instrumented.
10from receiving a pro¯t-related payment.17 This may be due to the e®ects of pro¯t sharing on
wage °exibility, since young and older workers often bear the burden of cyclical °uctuations in
terms of excess separations (see for example Gielen and van Ours (2006a)). After controlling
for unobserved characteristics, the positive e®ect on training for prime-age workers disappears.
Apparently, selectivity e®ects are mostly present among prime-age workers. The probability
of receiving training for older workers increases by 2.7 percentage points if they are paid a
pro¯t-related wage, which is signi¯cantly higher than for prime-age workers. This suggests
that paying a pro¯t-related wage can be e®ective in increasing training investments, and hence
improving the labor market position, of older workers.
4.2 Wage estimation
This section investigates how pro¯t sharing and speci¯c training a®ect workers' productivity.
Unfortunately, there is no information on worker productivity available in the dataset. There-
fore, the e®ectiveness of training is measured through earned wages, as increased productivity















ij + "ijt (2)
where w is the log hourly wage, Z is a vector of observable characteristics, and PS is a dummy
for pro¯t sharing. Furthermore, T c is an indicator for speci¯c training with the current employer
17Note that the inclusion of age-speci¯c e®ects only marginally improves the model ¯t. Furthermore, one
may argue that the use of age classes is not appropriate as some individuals may change from one class to an
older age class during the sample period. However, in this sample only 8 percent of young workers (2.6 percent
of the total sample) is de¯ned as prime-age later in the sample period, and only 3 percent of prime-age workers
(1.7 percent of the total sample) reaches the age of 50 during the sample period.
18Note that wages may be an imperfect measure of productivity, especially for old workers. Furthermore,
Dearden et al. (2006) illustrate that the productivity gains from training in an analysis using wage information
provide a lower bound on the actual training e®ect, since some share of the productivity gain may accrue to
the employer rather than to the worker.
19Note that equations (1) and (2) can be considered a recursive system, as equation (2) includes the endogenous
variable training on the right-hand side. However, the residuals of each equation are assumed to be independent
due to the inclusion of a wide range of observable characteristics and the individual worker ¯xed e®ects. As
a result, equation-by-equation estimation yields consistent estimates (Maddala and Lee (1976)). In particular,
if the presence of time-varying unobserved characteristics were to violate the assumption of independent error
terms, the model parameters are identi¯ed in equation-by-equation estimating due to the appearance of some
exogenous variables in one equation but not in the other.
11since the start of the employment relationship. In order to control for transferability of skills in
the analysis, an indicator for training investments with previous employers (T p) is also included
(see also Booth and Bryan (2005)).20 The inclusion of an individual worker-¯xed e®ect (®w)
corrects for an ability bias in the returns to training which may arise if, for example, training
costs are lower for high-ability workers and therefore training investments will be higher for
more able workers. Additionally, one needs to correct for job-¯xed e®ects (ºw
ij), as potential
estimation biases in the returns to training may remain due to non-random job mobility. Since
workers who have invested a lot in training are willing to change jobs only if the wage gain is
su±ciently large, previously accumulated training is correlated with the increase in job quality
when a worker quits his or her job.21 The job e®ect is approximated by a job-speci¯c e®ect
which is the same across individuals (ºw
j ). This job e®ect measures the average wage e®ect
of a job change. It is modelled by introducing 5 dummy variables each indicating a new job;
the reference group is the ¯rst job observed in the sample period.22 That is, the ¯rst dummy
has the value 1 throughout the duration of the second job; the second dummy equals 1 for the
duration of the third job, etc. Hence, the wage gain of the ¯rst job change is assumed to be
equal for all individuals, as is the gain of each of the following job changes. This approach
follows Loewenstein and Spletzer (1998) and Booth and Bryan (2005, 2007).23 Despite the
inclusion of ºw
j in the model, a bias may potentially still exist if workers who invest in training
more than the average worker also receive higher-than-average returns to a job change. As a
result, the returns to tenure should be interpreted with caution. Two separate speci¯cations
are estimated. The ¯rst speci¯cation uses dummy variables for the incidence of current and
previous employer training; in the second speci¯cation, the accumulated number of training
events is used for T c and T p.
20Since the training investments before 1998 cannot be identi¯ed, Tp represents all training with previous
employers accumulated from the start of the sample. The omitted training history before the start of the sample
is assumed to be captured by the individual worker ¯xed e®ect.
21For a more detailed discussion of the potential bias, see Loewenstein and Spletzer (1998) and Booth and
Bryan (2007).
22Since the sample contains only 6 (annual) waves, a maximum of 5 new jobs can be observed.
23A test for the overall model ¯t suggests that this speci¯cation is preferred over a speci¯cation with individual
job-¯xed e®ects (ºw
ij). Also note that the returns to training with previous employers could not be identi¯ed in
a model with individual job-speci¯c e®ects (ºw
ij).
12Panel A of Table 4 presents the estimation results of the baseline model. The results
suggest that both pro¯t sharing and training positively a®ect workers' wages. Along with the
¯ndings from Table 3, this suggests that pro¯t sharing increases wages not only by eliciting
larger worker e®ort, but also through skill accumulation. Note that training with the current
employer is rewarded more than training with previous employers.24 This may be due to the
fact that speci¯c training is only partially transferable across employers, which was also found
previously for the US (Loewenstein and Spletzer (1998, 1999)) and Germany (Gathmann and
SchÄ onberg (2006)). Alternatively, it can be explained by an information asymmetry, where
the training ¯rm is better able to value the trained skills than other ¯rms (Acemoglu and
Pischke (1998)). Finally, the returns to training with previous employers may be rewarded
less as these skills may have already started to become obsolete. The results in the second
column indicate that each additional training with the current employer increases the wage by
about 1.5 percent. Pro¯t sharing has a slightly higher e®ect on wages. Workers who receive a
pro¯t-related payment earn 2.6 percent higher wages, ceteris paribus.25
Current training may not immediately increase wages as training participation reduces time
spent on work. As a result, training may lead to a higher wage especially after the training is
completed. Panel B of Table 4 presents some sensitivity results, where a distinction is made
between current training (T) and previously accumulated training (T c0) with the current em-
ployer.26 The results illustrate that training indeed pays o® in terms of higher wages especially
after one year. There therefore seems to be a small lag in the returns to training.
The ¯nding that both training and pro¯t sharing have a positive e®ect on the wage, in
addition to the positive e®ect of pro¯t sharing on training investments (Table 3), may give rise
to a bias in estimating the e®ort e®ect. That is, pro¯t sharing may not only have a direct
e®ect on wages via increased e®ort (i.e. e®ort e®ect), but also an indirect e®ect via increased
24Booth and Bryan (2005) ¯nd that for the period 1998-2000 the returns to training with previous employers
in the UK exceed the returns to training with the current employer. However, this di®erence disappears when
the sample period is extended to 1998-2003. In the ¯rst column the estimated coe±cients for Tc and Tp are
not signi¯cantly di®erent; in the second column the returns to previous training with the current employer are
signi¯cantly larger than the returns to training with previous employers.
25A similar result has been found for the US by Azfar and Danninger (2001), who show that pro¯t sharing
added 3 percent to annual wage growth, while training had a slightly smaller but insigni¯cant e®ect.
26Note that the model ¯t is only signi¯cantly improved for the model using training incidence (F statistic =
12.3); not for the model using the amount of training (F-statistic = 1.3).
13returns to training (i.e. training e®ect). When pro¯t sharing increases training investments due
to increased returns to training, the e®ort e®ect of pro¯t sharing will be overestimated when
the e®ect on training returns is not taken into account. As part of a sensitivity analysis panel
C presents estimation results where the e®ect on the returns to training is controlled for by
including an interaction term between pro¯t sharing and training.27 The results suggest that
the e®ort e®ect of pro¯t sharing is indeed lower than in the previous speci¯cations. However,
this is not due to an increase in returns to current training, but to larger returns to training
with previous employers.28 This may be due to the presence of asymmetric information with
respect to the quality of previous training. Employers may ¯nd it di±cult to value the quality of
skills obtained in training with previous employers, therefore these skills may be less rewarded
than recently acquired skills (as was shown in Panel A). However, this implies that there
exist external bene¯ts of training for other ¯rms, which may cause the level of speci¯c training
investments to be sub-optimally low. Pro¯t sharing enables workers to seize some of the returns
to previous-employer training as their wage is linked to their productivity, which increases the
returns to training for the worker and consequently reduces the external bene¯ts for other
¯rms. As a result, increasing the prevalence of performance-related wages may increase training
investments and reduce ine±ciency in training levels.
In panel D, age-speci¯c e®ects in the returns to training and pro¯t sharing are introduced.29
The results indicate that the returns to training with the current employer especially increase
wages for young and prime-age workers.30 Furthermore, wages for young workers are positively
a®ected by training with previous employers. The increase in wage for young workers is ex-
pected to re°ect an increase in productivity. It is possible that, in the case of older workers,
training serves as an instrument to reduce the wage-productivity gap (and hence to reduce the
probability of involuntary separation) rather than to obtain a higher wage. On the other hand,
27For the model, using the amount of training including the interaction term improves the model ¯t only
marginally. The F-statistic equals 3.2 and 2.7 for the model in the ¯rst and second column, respectively.
28Note that these ¯ndings may be a®ected by the lack of accurate productivity information. It is possible
that the returns to training in the current match are increased by pro¯t sharing as well, but this may not be
re°ected in the workers' wage if the gains accrue to the employer.
29In order to control for di®erent average returns to training across the separate age groups, age-speci¯c vj are
included in this speci¯cation. The model ¯t is signi¯cantly better compared to the baseline model (F-statistic
is 14.0 and 16.4 for the estimation in the ¯rst and second columns, respectively).
30Though the result is only signi¯cantly di®erent in the estimation using the amount of training.
14for older workers, pro¯t sharing is an e®ective alternative to increase wages.
4.3 Employability
This section investigates how pro¯t sharing and investments in speci¯c training a®ect the em-
ployability of the worker. Highly employable workers are more likely to be retained within
the ¯rm and are thus less likely to separate. Therefore, the employability of the worker is
investigated by estimating the separation probability. However, if for some reason the worker
separates from the ¯rm, good employability will increase the probability of ¯nding new em-
ployment. Low-employable workers are more likely to enter inactivity after a separation has
occurred. Since employability not only a®ects the probability to separate from the current
employer, but also the probability to ¯nd alternative employment, a distinction can be made
between ¯rm-internal employability and external employability. Separate models are estimated
for the di®erent types of separations:












i ); S = (s;se;so) (3)
where P is the next-period probability of a separation in general (s), a separation to other
employment (se) or a separation to inactivity (so) (e.g. unemployment, retirement and dis-
ability), respectively.31 Furthermore, H is a vector of time-varying observable characteristics,
®S controls for time-invariant worker characteristics, PS is a pro¯t sharing dummy, and the
incidence of training (in the current and in previous matches) is represented by T c and T p,
respectively.32 The estimation results are presented in Table 5.33 Training with the current
31Note that a promotion is not considered as a separation as this study is mainly interested in between-
employer job changes. Furthermore, se and so can also be estimated as a binary choice model with selection,
i.e. conditional upon leaving the current employer. However, here the ¯xed e®ects are expected to pick up most
of this selectivity.
32When the number of training events is included rather than the training incidence, the results are more
or less una®ected. Though one important change is that the number of training events in the current match
reduces job-to-job changes initially, but increases this probability as the number of training events becomes
larger. This may be possibly due to the fact that some share of the speci¯c training has a general character
as well. As this training is also productive in other ¯rms, competing ¯rms may lure away trained workers (i.e.
poaching externality; Pigou (1912), Stevens (1994)). However, an LR-test indicates that a model including
the incidence of training performs signi¯cantly better. Therefore, only those results are presented where the
training incidence is used in the set of regressors.
33Marginal e®ects evaluated at the mean of the covariates are presented in square brackets. When evaluating
the marginal e®ects, the ¯xed e®ects are assumed to equal zero.
15employer reduces the probability to separate from the employer. Along with the positive ef-
fects on worker productivity (as was found in the previous section), this result suggests that
training improves the internal employability of the worker. Training with previous employers
reduces all types of separations34, which suggests that life-long learning improves the worker's
employability in all aspects: not only does it improve the quality of the current employment re-
lationship (internal employability), it also reduces the probability of becoming inactive later in
life (external employability). Furthermore, pro¯t sharing decreases the next-period separation
probability, possibly due to increased wage °exibility or the higher e®ort level which improves
match quality.35
Employability is especially a concern for older workers. Older workers are often denoted
as being expensive labor due to a gap between wages and productivity (Dostie (2006)). Fur-
thermore, if older workers separate from their employer, this separation is most likely to be a
one-way exit out of employment (Gielen and Van Ours (2006a)). As part of a sensitivity anal-
ysis, in Panel B age-speci¯c e®ects are introduced to see how the employability is a®ected for
the separate age groups.36 The results illustrate that training in the current match particularly
improves employment stability for young and old. For young, the probability of separating to
other employment and or to inactivity are reduced by speci¯c training. Apparently, training
investments improve the productivity of the match thereby improving the position of young
workers both within the ¯rm, thereby reducing the need to look for a job with alternative
employers, and on the external labor market. For older workers, the probability to separate
from the employer to other employment is reduced.37 Though this may indicate a greater sta-
34The large marginal e®ect that is found for training with previous employers may result from the fact that
about 80 percent of the workers have had some previous training. The estimation results including the number
of training events (which are likely to exhibit more variation) indicate that each additional training event with
previous employers reduces the separation probability by about 3 percentage points. On average, workers have
had 2.3 training courses with previous employers.
35Di®erentiating between voluntary and involuntary job separations (involuntary separations comprise sep-
arations for reasons of redundancy, dismissal or temporary job termination; voluntary job separations include
all other reasons for leaving the job (including retirement)) shows that pro¯t sharing reduces both types of
separations. However, these results are not presented (though available upon request) because this distinction
is not as clear-cut as the distinction made in Table 5, since some separations (such as retirement or changing
employers) may result after a layo® noti¯cation and hence may not have such a voluntary character after all.
36Note, that an LR-test suggests that this speci¯cation is preferred over the baseline model. However, adding
age-speci¯c e®ects for pro¯t sharing does not improve the model ¯t.
37The coe±cients for young and old are not signi¯cantly di®erent. Furthermore, an LR-test between this
16bility of the current employment relationship, it does not necessarily imply an improvement
of the employability on the external labor market in terms of better job-¯nding rates. How-
ever, accumulated training over the working life does improve the external employability as it
reduces the probability to leave the labor market for older workers. Consequently, paying a
pro¯t-related wage to older workers directly a®ects their internal employability by increasing
worker productivity, and it has an indirect e®ect on the external employability in the long run
by increasing training investments.
5 Conclusions
Training is an important instrument for improving the productivity of a worker-¯rm match.
However, training investments may be rather low due to market imperfections. Using data for
the UK, this study has shown that pro¯t-related pay schemes can be e®ective in increasing
training investments, especially for young and older workers.
Pro¯t sharing may increase training investments due to a reduction in the separation prob-
ability or to increased returns to training. From the separation results it appears that pro¯t
sharing reduces the probability to separate from the current employer, possibly because it en-
hances wage °exibility, thereby providing an incentive to invest (more) in training. The wage
results indicate that both training and pro¯t sharing positively a®ect workers' wages. Hence,
pro¯t sharing increases workers' productivity not only by eliciting greater worker e®ort, but
also through skills accumulation. The age-speci¯c results suggest that training improves the
employability of young workers both within the ¯rm and in the external labor market. Further-
more, paying a pro¯t-related wage to older workers directly a®ects their internal employability
by increasing worker productivity, and it has an indirect e®ect on the external employability in
the long run by increasing training investments.
In addition, pro¯t sharing may increase training investments by raising the returns to train-
ing. In fact, the wage results suggest that pro¯t sharing only increases the returns to training
with previous employers. Such training may normally be less rewarded than recent training due
model and a model where current training for young and old is grouped in one variable suggests that the
negative e®ect of current training is equal (and signi¯cant) for young and old.
17to asymmetric information on the value of the skills acquired with previous employers. Because
of the external bene¯ts for other ¯rms, under-investment in speci¯c training may arise. The
results suggest that pro¯t sharing can reduce these external bene¯ts by aligning wages more
to productivity. Thus, if pro¯t sharing becomes more widely used, training investments may
increase.
All in all, the results in the previous section illustrate that paying a pro¯t-related wage
bene¯ts both workers and ¯rms in terms of higher productive employment relationships, due
to both increased e®ort and higher levels of training. Higher training levels arise because
pro¯t sharing reduces the number of separations resulting from wage rigidities, and because
pro¯t sharing also reduces the gap between wages and productivity. This may reduce under-
investment in training levels. In addition, increasing the incidence of pro¯t sharing may have
positive e®ects on the employability of young and older workers. In as much as this translates
into a higher labor productivity and increased labor market participation of older workers,
society as a whole may bene¯t as well. However, despite these advantages, the incidence of
pro¯t sharing appears to be rather limited, possibly because ¯rms are reluctant to switch to
pro¯t sharing wage schemes as this may create con°ict between the workers and the owners of
the ¯rm. More competitive ¯rms whose pro¯t levels are already quite low are not able to share
the pro¯t with workers while still satisfying the owners of the ¯rm. Furthermore, changing
from ¯xed wages to pro¯t-related wages increases risk exposure for workers by making them
residual claimants. However, unlike other residual claimants (such as shareholders) this risk is
not compensated with an ownership stake that would enable workers to be involved in decision
making. Employers may therefore be reluctant to switch to pro¯t sharing as they fear that
employees may demand more in°uence in the managerial decision making process. The presence
of external bene¯ts of training provide an economic rationale for government intervention aimed
at increasing the use of pro¯t-related pay schemes in order to increase training levels.
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21Table 1: Age-speci¯c sample means
Young Prime-age Old Total
16-29 30-49 50-64
N 5264 8510 3195 16969
Training (%) 31.1 30.1 24.1 29.1
Speci¯c training (%)a 24.3 25.8 19.4 24.0
Number of speci¯c training courses per year 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.4
- Given that training is undertaken 1.6 1.8 1.7 1.7
Pro¯t sharing (%) 36.0 44.7 35.0 40.0
Gross hourly wage ($)b 6.7 11.3 10.0 9.7
Annual separation rate (%) 39.8 20.2 17.2 24.9
- To other employment (%) 32.7 17.9 10.6 20.3
- To inactivity (%) 7.1 2.3 6.7 4.6
a Note that about 83 percent of all training has a speci¯c character. This is due to the
fact that most training reported appears to have both a general and a speci¯c character.
b Denoted in UK pounds (index year = 2000).





No Wijt = 8.4 Wijt = 10.7 Wijt = 9.3
V (Wijt) = 31.6 V (Wijt) = 53.4 V (Wijt) = 41.1
N = 8234 N = 4672 N = 12906
48.5% 27.5% 76.0%
Yes Wijt = 10.1 Wijt = 12.1 Wijt = 11.0
V (Wijt) = 43.8 V (Wijt) = 60.0 V (Wijt) = 52.3
N = 2277 N = 17867 N = 4063
13.4% 10.6% 23.9%
All Wijt = 8.8 Wijt = 11.1 Wijt = 9.7
V (Wijt) = 34.7 V (Wijt) = 55.6 V (Wijt) = 44.4
N = 10511 N = 6458 N = 169696
61.9% 38.1% 100.0%
Note: Wijt denotes the average gross hourly wage; V (¢) is the variance.
23Table 3: Parameter estimates training equation
Logit FE Logit
A. Baseline model
PS 0:316 (0:046)¤¤ 0:184 (0:067)¤¤
[0.054] [0.011]
Tenure ¡0:064 (0:010)¤¤ ¡0:060 (0:016)¤¤
[-0.011] [-0.004]
Tenure2 (*0.1) 0:019 (0:004)¤¤ 0:014 (0:007)¤¤
[0.003] [0.001]
Age ¡0:016 (0:002)¤¤ ¡0:136 (0:024)¤¤
[-0.003] [-0.008]
Temporary job ¡0:753 (0:103)¤¤ ¡0:558 (0:159)¤¤
[-0.103] [-0.026]
Number of working hours 0:013 (0:003)¤¤ 0:016 (0:005)¤¤
[0.002] [0.001]
Education level
Low quali¯cation 0:145 (0:144) 0:859 (0:496)¤
[0.025] [0.071]
Medium quali¯cation 0:748 (0:112)¤¤ 1:661 (0:401)¤¤
[0.134] [0.136]
High quali¯cation 1:275 (0:109)¤¤ 2:553 (0:403)¤¤
[0.218] [0.145]
Log L -8614.61 -2968.36
B. Age-speci¯c e®ects
PS: Young 0:299 (0:070)¤¤ 0:247 (0:106)¤¤
[0.053] [0.014]
Prime-age 0:278 (0:057)¤¤ 0:077 (0:086)
[0.049] [0.004]
Old 0:503 (0:106)¤¤ 0:427 (0:159)¤¤
[0.095] [0.027]
Log L -8611.69 -2965.85
Note: Logit estimation results are based on 16969 observations; ¯xed e®ects esti-
mation on 8601 observations. Training refers to speci¯c training. All estimations
include information on pro¯t sharing (PS) tenure, tenure squared, age, local unem-
ployment rate, education level (reference category is no education), ¯rm size, oc-
cupation, industry, temporary work, union coverage, number of working hours and
spousal working hours. Standard errors are in parentheses, a **/* indicates that
the coe±cient is di®erent from zero at a 5%/10% level of signi¯cance. Marginal
e®ects evaluated at the mean of the covariates are presented in square brackets.
24Table 4: Parameter estimates wage equation
Training incidence Amount of training
A. Baseline model
Tc 0:035 (0:011)¤¤ 0:015 (0:003)¤¤
Tp 0:031 (0:018)¤ 0:006 (0:005)
PS 0:026 (0:009)¤¤ 0:026 (0:009)¤¤
Adjusted R2 0.822 0.823
B. Sensitivity 1: Current vs. previous training
T 0:015 (0:009) 0:011 (0:005)¤¤
T
0c 0:051 (0:011)¤¤ 0:016 (0:003)¤¤
Tp 0:030 (0:018)¤ 0:006 (0:005)
PS 0:025 (0:009)¤¤ 0:026 (0:009)¤¤
Adjusted R2 0.823 0.823
C. Sensitivity 2: E®ort vs. training
Tc 0:032 (0:013)¤¤ 0:014 (0:004)¤¤
Tp 0:010 (0:020) 0:001 (0:005)
PS 0:015 (0:011) 0:018 (0:010)¤
PS ¤ Tc 0:006 (0:015) 0:002 (0:004)
PS ¤ Tp 0:053 (0:022)¤¤ 0:015 (0:007)¤¤
Adjusted R2 0.822 0.823
D. Sensitivity 3: Age-speci¯c e®ects
Tc: Young 0:045 (0:017)¤¤ 0:039 (0:007)¤¤
Prime-age 0:034 (0:014)¤¤ 0:015 (0:004)¤¤
Old 0:023 (0:024) 0:002 (0:005)
Tp: Young 0:082 (0:028)¤¤ 0:027 (0:009)¤¤
Prime-age 0:020 (0:024) 0:009 (0:006)
Old ¡0:014 (0:043) 0:001 (0:010)
PS: Young 0:029 (0:015)¤ 0:026 (0:015)¤
Prime-age 0:015 (0:012) 0:016 (0:012)
Old 0:040 (0:018)¤¤ 0:041 (0:018)¤¤
Adjusted R2 0.824 0.825
N observations 8261
N worker ¯xed e®ects 2140
Note: Dependent variable is the log of gross hourly wage (in British pounds in-
dexed at year 2000 values). All estimations also include information on region,
marital status, tenure, tenure squared, experience, experience squared, local un-
employment rate, union coverage, education level, ¯rm size, occupation, industry,
temporary work, job quality, and individual worker ¯xed e®ects. Standard errors
are in parentheses, a **/* indicates that the coe±cient is di®erent from zero at a
5%/10% level of signi¯cance.
25Table 5: Probability of separation - parameter estimates
logit
Separations at t + 1
total to other employment to inactivity
A. Baseline model
Tc ¡0:196 (0:086)¤¤ ¡0:141 (0:087) ¡0:245 (0:245)
[-0.046] [-0.025] [-0.003]
Tp ¡1:432 (0:120)¤¤ ¡1:312 (0:121)¤¤ ¡0:777 (0:349)¤¤
[-0.343] [-0.272] [-0.012]
PS ¡0:349 (0:069)¤¤ ¡0:353 (0:071)¤¤ ¡0:172 (0:193)
[-0.082] [-0.064] [-0.002]
log L -2687.8 -2505.6 -405.5
B. Sensitivity: Age-speci¯c e®ects
Tc: Young ¡0:499 (0:129)¤¤ ¡0:407 (0:129)¤¤ ¡0:741 (0:387)¤
[-0.124] [-0.085] [-0.037]
Prime-age ¡0:038 (0:108) 0:055 (0:110) ¡0:294 (0:344)
[-0.009] [0.011] [-0.012]
Old ¡0:026 (0:208) ¡0:146 (0:226) 0:711 (0:601)
[-0.007] [-0.029] [0.020]
Tp: Young ¡1:179 (0:179)¤¤ ¡1:153 (0:177)¤¤ ¡0:347 (0:511)
[-0.280] [-0.263] [-0.015]
Prime-age ¡1:561 (0:143)¤¤ ¡1:455 (0:146)¤¤ ¡0:394 (0:470)
[-0.359] [-0.332] [-0.017]
Old ¡1:625 (0:295)¤¤ ¡1:183 (0:312)¤¤ ¡2:936 (0:777)¤¤
[-0.360] [-0.274] [-0.375]
PS ¡0:343 (0:069)¤¤ ¡0:345 (0:071)¤¤ ¡0:163 (0:196)
[-0.085] [-0.068] [-0.006]
log L -2679.6 -2499.1 -394.6
Note: Estimation results include worker ¯xed e®ects and are based on 7647, 7048 and
1519 observations, respectively. All estimations also include information on tenure, tenure
squared, age, age squared, occupation, union coverage, education level, part-time work
dummy, ¯rm size, industry. Standard errors are in parentheses, a **/* indicates that the
coe±cient is di®erent from zero at a 5%/10% level of signi¯cance. Marginal e®ects are in
square brackets.
26Figure 1: Separation rate at t + 1
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This dummy variable indicates whether or not someone has received a pro¯t sharing payment
in the last 12 months. The exact question for waves 8 to 13 is: "In the last 12 months have
you received any bonuses such as a Christmas or quarterly bonus, pro¯t-related pay or pro¯t
sharing bonus, or an occasional commission?". However, until 1996 the question was phrased in
terms of pro¯t-related incentive payments only ("Does your pay ever include incentive bonuses
or pro¯t related pay?"). As the responses in terms of percentage of sample which reported
"Yes" in waves 1-5 do not di®er on average from the responses in waves 6-13, it is assumed that
people only reported payments related to pro¯t sharing (or another collective performance pay
scheme). Furthermore, as of 1998 (wave 8) an additional question on individual performance
pay was added to the questionnaire. This con¯rms the assumption that people will only report
the receipt of some (collective) pro¯t-related payment scheme in the question described above.
Training:
As of wave 8 detailed information is obtained for up to three training events received by workers
since September 1 of the previous year. Training includes any part-time education received
while being employed. The exact question is: "Was this course or training: (1) To help you
get started in your current job; (2) To increase your skills in your current job; (3) To improve
your skills in the current job; (4) To prepare you for a job or jobs you might do in the future;
(5) To develop your skills generally?". Note that people can report more than one of the ¯ve
categories. My measure of speci¯c training includes training which served to increase (Ad. 2)
or improve (Ad. 3) skills in the current job, regardless of whether this was employer-provided
or not. About 75 percent of all training events was de¯ned as speci¯c. There is a great overlap
between general and speci¯c training. Only 16 percent of all training events were reported
as general training only. This chapter focuses on any training which has a speci¯c character
(regardless of whether it also served general purposes) since the main interest is in the direct
e®ects on productivity and employability.
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